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Abstract
We examine experimentally how humans behave when they, unbeknownst to them,
play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure
minimax strategy. A minority of subjects’ play was consistent with their Nash equi-
librium strategy. But a larger percentage of subjects’ play was more consistent with
different models of play: equiprobable play for the zero-sum game, and the minimax
strategy in the non-profitable game.
† National University of Singapore Email: bizjs@nus.edu.sg
‡ Georgia State University Email: swarthout@gsu.edu
1 Introduction
How do humans play in normal form games against opponents who play their part of a
strictly mixed strategy Nash equilibrium? If we view Nash equilibrium as a positive theory,
we predict humans will play their parts of a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. However,
a Nash equilibrium in strictly mixed strategies has some attributes which undermine our
confidence in this prediction. First, a strictly mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a normal
from game is weak – namely a player will have more than one action that is a best response
to his opponent’s equilibrium strategy. Another reason is that a player’s mixed strategy
doesn’t depend on his own payoff function but rather his opponent’s payoff function. In
other words, a player’s equilibrium strategy is calculated as to make other players indifferent
between different actions. Not surprisingly, previous experimental studies have shown that
mixed strategy equilibria are less likely to be played than pure strategy equilibria. This
study provides an incisive test of how self enforcing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is.
We report an experiment in which each subject repeatedly plays a simple 2 × 2 normal
form game for which the unique Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies. In all sessions,
each subject is paired against a computerized algorithm which plays its part of the Nash
equilibrium profile. Two different games are used in this study, with each subject playing only
one. One game is zero-sum and the other is unprofitable (the minimax and Nash equilibrium
solutions are distinct but yield the same expected payoff for each player). By having the
computer play its part of Nash equilibrium, we have provided an ideal environment to see if
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is self enforcing with the subject adopting his part of
the profile.
We present three hypotheses to evaluate human behavior when facing an opponent fol-
lowing its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The first hypothesis is that human subjects
will adopt their part of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. For most subjects we reject
this hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that subjects will adopt an equiprobable mixed
strategy. There is support for this hypothesis in the aggregated data across subjects in the
zero-sum game; however, at the individual level there is too much heterogeneity to conclude
the subjects are all choosing the equiprobable mixed strategy. The third hypothesis is that
subjects who play the unprofitable game will play a pure strategy minimax strategy rather
than their part of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We find some support for this
hypothesis.
Our current study builds upon the results of several past studies. There is an extensivre
literature examining the behavior of human subjects playing zero-sum games which have
a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Many studies reach the conclusions that
subjects do not play according to the Nash Equilibrium mixture (Brown and Rosenthal
(1990), Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker (2003), and Shachat (2002)) and that play does not
generally converge over time to the Nash equilibrium (Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) and
Erev and Roth (1998)). In contrast, some studies argue that while one can statistically reject
the precise predictions of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium predictions do
a satisfactory job of qualitatively describing how subjects play (O’Neill (1987) and Binmore,
Swierzbinski, and Proulx (2001)). Several studies have taken our approach of having a
human subject play the same type of zero-sum games against a computer implementing
a mixed Nash equilibrium strategy (Lieberman (1962), Messick (1967), and Fox (1972)).
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These studies have found that the human play does not conform to the Nash equilibrium
strategies.1 Another set of studies have shown that in non-zero sum games which have a
unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, subjects’ play depends significantly on structure
of the magnitude of their own potential game payoffs (Ochs (1995), McKelvey, Palfrey, and
Weber (2000) and Willinger and Noussair (2003)). In this present study, we consider one
type of own payoff function effect by comparing the behavior in a zero-sum game to that in
an unprofitable game. Morgan and Sefton (2002) found that in 3 × 3 unprofitable games,
neither Nash equilibrium nor minimax accurately described play in their experiment.
We proceed by presenting the two games and their theoretical solutions in the next
section. In the third section we describe our experimental design. In section four we present
our data analysis and evaluate our hypotheses. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks.
2 The Games
The first game we employ is a zero-sum asymmetric matching pennies game introduced by
Rosenthal et al. (2003). The game is called Pursue-Evade because the Row player “captures”
points from the Column play on a match, and the Column player avoids a loss when he
avoids a match. In the game each player can move either Left or Right. The normal form
representation of the game is given in Figure 1. The game has a unique Nash equilibrium in
which each player chooses Left with probability two-thirds. In equilibrium, Row’s expected
payoff is 2/3 and Column’s expected payoff is -2/3.
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Figure 1: The Pursue-Evade Game
The second game we employ is a unprofitable game introduced by Shachat and Swarthout
(2004) referred to as Gamble-Safe. Each player has a Gamble action (Left for each player)
from which he receives a payoff of either two or zero and a Safe action (Right for each player)
which guarantees a payoff of one. The normal form representation of the game is given in
Figure 2. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which each player chooses his Left
action with probability one-half, and his expected equilibrium payoff is one. Notice that this
game is not constant-sum; therefore the minimax solution need not coincide with the Nash
equilibrium. In this game, Right is the minimax strategy for both players and it guarantees a
payoff of one. A game for which minimax and Nash equilibrium solutions differ but generate
1These studies substantially differ from ours as they informed subjects they were playing against a com-
puter but not what strategy the computer is playing. Also, some of the experiments did not provide perfect
information regarding the payoff functions of the games.
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Figure 2: The Gamble-Safe Game
the same expected payoff is called an unprofitable game. Aumann (1985) argues that the
Nash equilibrium prediction is not a plausible prediction in such a game because to achieve
the Nash level payoff by playing the Nash equilibrium strategy requires assuming unnecessary
risk. For example, If the Row player plays his Nash equilibrium strategy while the Column
player adopts his minimax strategy Right, then the Row player’s expected payoff is one-
half. This aspect makes the Gamble-Safe game a more challenging for the Nash equilibrium
solution concept than does the zero-sum Pursue-Evade game.
3 Experimental Design
We conducted the experiment sessions in the Economic Science Laboratory at the University
of Arizona and the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center. We report results from six sessions,
using a total of 60 undergraduate students. Each session contained between 8 and 16 subjects.
The subjects were evenly divided between the Pursue-Evade and the Gamble-Safe game
treatments. Half of the subjects were assigned as Row players, and the other half were
assigned as Column players. Each subject was seated at a computer workstation such that
no subject could observe another subject’s screen. Subjects first read instructions detailing
how to enter decisions and how earnings were determined. Then, 200 repetitions of the game
were played. For the Pursue-Evade game, each Column subject was initially endowed with
a balance of 250 tokens, while a Row subject began with no tokens: each token was valued
at 10 cents. Each subject’s total earnings consisted of either a $5 (University of Arizona)
or a $15 (T.J. Watson Research Center) show-up payment plus his token balance after the
200th repetition. No Column subjects went bankrupt.
At the beginning of each repetition, a subject saw a graphical representation of the game
on the screen. Each Column subject’s game display was transformed so that he appeared
to be a Row player. Thus, each subject selected an action by clicking on a row, and then
confirmed his selection. After the repetition was complete, each subject saw the outcome
highlighted on the game display, as well as a text message stating both players’ actions and
his own earnings for that repetition. Finally, at all times a subject’s current token balance
and a history of past play were displayed. The history consisted of an ordered list with each
row displaying the repetition number, the actions selected by both players, and the subject’s
payoffs from the specific repetition.
In each session, a Row subject and a Column subject played against each other for
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the first twenty-three repetitions of the game. Then, unbeknownst to the human pair, they
stopped playing against each other and for the remainder of the experiment they each played
against a computer that implemented the Nash equilibrium strategy.2
We adopted a simple technique to make the transition from human versus human to
human versus Nash equilibrium seamless from the subjects’ perspective. From period twenty-
four onward, each human pair had no further interaction except for the timing of how action
choices were revealed. Specifically, although the computers generated their action choices
instantly, the computers didn’t reveal their choices until both humans had selected their
actions. This protocol preserved the natural timing rhythm established by the humans in
the first twenty-three stage games and helped mask the fact the subjects were playing against
a computer. Given the structure of the games and the design of the experiments, there are
some natural hypotheses we will test in the next section.
4 Data Analysis
A useful starting point is to inspect each subject’s action choice frequencies versus the
realized action choice frequencies generated by his computerized Nash equilibrium opponent.
We present this view of the data for those subjects who were Pursue-Evade Row players in
Figure 3, Pursue-Evade Column players in Figure 4, Gamble-Safe Row Players in Figure 5,
and Gamble-Safe Column players in Figure 6. In each of these figures, the x-axis is the
proportion of Left play for the Column player and the y-axis is the proportion of Left play
for the Row player. Within each of these figures is a collection of arrows. Each arrow is a
summary of play for a single human-computer pair. The origin of the arrow is located at the
joint frequency of Left play in stage games twenty-four through one hundred, and the tip of
the arrowhead is located at the joint frequency of Left play in the final one hundred stage
games. These arrows show the adjustments subjects make from the first half of stage games
to the second half.
In Figure 3, we see in the Pursue-Evade game that the Human Row subjects’ frequency of
Left play is contained within the 50 to 70 percent range and its difficult to ascertain whether
Nash equilibrium or equi-probable play better describes the data. For the Human Column
subjects in the same game, Figure 4 shows greater heterogeneity of play; there is a cluster
of observations around 50 percent and also some subjects who play Left or Right nearly
exclusively. In Figure 5, we see that Human Row subjects in the Gamble-Safe game appear
on average to play the Gamble action less than 50 percent, but the range of left frequencies
is quite broad covering a range of 0 to 70 percent. For the Human Column subjects in this
game, Figure 6 suggests that there is a bias towards the minimax strategy as almost all
frequencies of Left are below 50 percent. We will now evaluate our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Subjects will adopt their part of the Nash equilibrium.
We first test this in the aggregate by pooling the last 100 rounds within each of the game
and player types, and then conducting a z-test that the proportion of Left play is 67 percent
2This initial phase of human versus human play is a byproduct of the fact that this data was originally
collected as part of another study presented in Shachat and Swarthout (2008).
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for the Pursue-Evade sessions, and 50 percent for Gamble-Safe sessions. The results of these
hypothesis tests are presented in Table 1. The results for the Gamble-Safe game are found
in the last two columns of the first row, and the results for the Pursue-Evade game are found
in the first two numerical columns of the second row. Nash Equilibrium is strongly rejected
in each case. However, the figures of joint play reviewed above suggest a fair amount of
heterogeneity in subject play, so we use a chi-square test to evaluate whether each subject is
using the same mixed strategy. The results are given in the third row of Table 1. Except in
the case of Row Pursue-Evade subjects, we reject homogeneity of play. This suggests testing
our hypotheses separately on each individual subject.
We next use the binomial test to determine whether each subject is playing his Nash
frequency of Left. For the Pursue-Evade game, the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction
for Left is two-thirds. We present these results in Table 2. For each subject we present his
frequency of Left play during rounds 101 through 200. A two-tailed test at the 95 percent
level of confidence gives us critical regions of less than 58 and more than 76 Left plays for the
final one hundred rounds of play. We reject the Nash proportion of Left play for six out of
fifteen Row subjects and for fourteen out of fifteen Column subjects. In Table 2 we boldface
these rejections and in the last row of Table 1 we report these total number of rejections.
We conduct a similar set of tests for the Gamble-Safe game where the Nash proportion
is 50 percent. In this case, the critical regions of the binomial test for the final 100 rounds
are less than forty and more than sixty Left plays. The results of these tests are given
in Table 3 where we boldface the rejections, and we report the number of rejections in
row four of Table 1. Here the Nash hypothesis is rejected for eleven out of fifteen Row
subjects and ten out of fifteen Column Subjects. In total 41 of our 60 subjects behave in a
manner inconsistent with the predictions of mixed-strategy equilibrium. We will now move
to consider other possible descriptions of play.
One non-equilibrium model of behavior that offers a reasonable alternative to Nash Equi-
librium play is equiprobable play: subjects play each action with equal frequency since the
expected payoff is the same for both actions. Of course, for the Gamble-Safe game, the Nash
equilibrium strategy and equal probability play both yield the same prediction. However,
in the Pursue-Evade game, Nash equilibrium is distinct from equal probable play. For those
subjects who play the Pursue-Evade Game we will test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Subjects will adopt an equiprobable mixed strategy in the Pursue-Evade game.
To test for equiprobable play in the Pursue-Evade game, we pool the data for the last
100 periods for each Row and Column subject, and see that a z-test rejects the hypothesis
that the proportion of Left and Right play are equal (see the first row of Table 1). We
also conduct a Binomial test on each subject’s choices at the 95 percent level of confidence
to evaluate individual equiprobable play, and we reject eight out of fifteen Row subjects
and seven out of fifteen Column subjects. These individual rejections are indicated by the
underlined proportions of Left play presented in Table 2. We conclude that one-half of the
Pursue-Evade subjects are behaving consistent with equal-probable play.
An implication of both the Nash Equilibrium and equiprobable play hypotheses is that
the subjects’ choices are generated from a time independent draws from a fixed distribution.
For each of our 60 subjects we conduct a non-parametric runs test for serial independence
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in the last 100 plays of the game. We reject serial independence for twenty-six of the sixty
subjects. These rejections are identified by bold-faced entries of columns four and seven of
Tables 2 and 3. Interestingly, twenty-two of these rejections come from a negative Z-value
below the rejection threshold. These rejections come from too few runs, evidence that there
is positive serial correlation not negative serial correlation.
Next we consider the minimax model of behavior as an alternative to mixed-strategy
equilibrium play in the Gamble-Safe game. Since the Gamble-Safe game is unprofitable, we
have a minimax strategy in this game which is distinct from mixed-strategy equilibrium play.
Hypothesis 3 Subjects will play a pure minimax strategy in the Gamble-Safe game.
For the Gamble-Safe game, the minimax strategy Right is the natural alternative to
Nash Play. For each subject we conduct a one-tailed binomial test at the 95 percent level
of confidence for each subject’s last 100 decisions to see whether Left is played statistically
significantly less than 50 percent. While this is not the most extreme test of minimax play, we
nonetheless view it as an appropriate threshold test to determine whether play deviates away
from mixed strategy equilibrium play in the direction of minimax play. The critical region
for this test is less than 38. The results of the test are reported Table 3 where rejections are
underlined, and in row five of Table 1. For six of the Row subjects and ten of the Column
subjects we reject Nash play of 50 percent Left in favor of the alternative of less than 50
percent. So minimax does attract play but not exclusively.
5 Conclusions
In this study we have examined the self enforcing nature of a Nash Equilibrium when it’s
unique and in mixed strategies. Our experiment is particularly well suited for this purpose,
as each subject plays against a computer which generates actions according to its mixed
strategy equilibrium strategy. However, because the timing of each stage game is tied to
when a pair of humans have made their choices, it’s not apparent to each subject that his
opponent is a computer. Our study employs two games. One is a zero-sum game for which
the minimax and Nash equilibrium solutions are the same. The other is a non-profitable
game which has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and a pure minimax strategy profile,
and thus provides a tougher challenge for the Nash equilibrium hypothesis.
In the constant sum Pursue-Evade game we found that we can reject Nash equilibrium
play for half of the Row subjects and all but one of the Column subjects. We also find that
we can reject equiprobable play for about half of both Row and Column subjects. Moreover
we find that, despite all subjects playing against the same equilibrium strategy, there is
significant heterogeneity across subjects. In the nonprofitable Gamble-Safe game, we reject
the Nash equilibrium (and equiprobable) model for two-thirds of both the Row and Column
players. Further, we see many of the human Column players selecting Left well below fifty
percent of the time, indicating a tendency towards the minimax safe strategy.
The general failure of a mixed strategy equilibrium to be self enforcing has significant
consequences. For example our study suggests that auditors are likely to falter in adopting
optimal monitoring frequencies which is likely to lead to greater losses or overexpenditure
on monitoring. Also, firms facing monopolistic competition are not likely to optimally mix
their pricing strategies and can be exploited.
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Notes: Each arrow represents a subject-computer pair. The tail of the arrow is the joint
frequency of Left play in rounds 24-100, and the head is the joint frequency of Left play
in rounds 101-200. The dashed lines denote the Nash equilibrium mixture of 2/3 Left.
Figure 3: Pursue-Evade Joint Left Frequencies of Human Row Players vs. Computer NE
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Notes: Each arrow represents a subject-computer pair. The tail of the arrow is the joint
frequency of Left play in rounds 24-100, and the head is the joint frequency of Left play
in rounds 101-200. The dashed lines denote the Nash equilibrium mixture of 2/3 Left.
Figure 4: Pursue-Evade Joint Left Frequencies of Human Column Players vs. Computer NE
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Figure 5: Gamble-Safe Joint Left Frequencies of Human Row Players vs. Computer NE
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Figure 6: Gamble-Safe Joint Left Frequencies of Human Column Players vs. Computer NE
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Table 1: Aggregate Hypothesis Tests
Null Hypothesis Test Type P-E Row P-E Column G-S Row G-S Column
Aggregated mixed strategy of 
Left with Probability of 50%
two-tailed z test 
(p-value)
7.28
(0.00)
-7.23
(0.00)
-2.84
(0.00)
-17.20
(0.00)
aggregated mixed strategy of 
Left with Probability of 67%
two-tailed z test 
(p-value)
-5.99
(0.00)
-21.42
(0.00)
All subjects use same mixed 
strategy
chi-square test
(p-value)
18.14
(0.20)
162.23
(0.00)
108.46
(0.00)
147.71
(0.00)
Individual subject's mixed 
strategy is 50%
binomal test 
#rejections at 95% 
level of confidence
8 7 11 10
Individual subject's mixed 
strategy is less than 50%
binomal test 
#rejections at 95% 
level of confidence
6 10
Individual subject's mixed 
strategy is 67%
binomal test 
#rejections at 95% 
level of confidence
6 14
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Table 2: Pursue-Evade Individual Subject Hypothesis Tests
Row Player Column Player
Session
Proportion
left
Runs test
statistic
Runs test
p-value
Proportion
left
Runs test
statistic
Runs test
p-value
1 0.62 -2.59 0.01 0.40 -1.26 0.21
2 0.43 -5.13 0.00 0.54 -0.95 0.34
3 0.66 -2.22 0.03 0.18 -3.26 0.00
4 0.48 -5.42 0.00 0.56 -2.50 0.01
5 0.61 -9.63 0.00 0.62 1.68 0.09
6 0.71 -1.02 0.31 0.45 -3.35 0.00
7 0.53 -0.97 0.33 0.48 -4.21 0.00
8 0.59 -0.08 0.94 0.03 -5.30 0.00
9 0.55 -0.30 0.76 0.54 0.67 0.50
10 0.52 0.02 0.99 0.40 -3.14 0.00
11 0.62 -3.44 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.89
12 0.64 -3.95 0.00 0.49 -1.81 0.07
13 0.72 -1.83 0.07 0.22 -8.04 0.00
14 0.52 0.02 0.99 0.38 1.90 0.06
15 0.71 -2.98 0.00 0.80 -0.63 0.53
Notes: A bold face proportion indicates a rejection of the Nash equilibrium proportion at
the 5% level of significance. An underlined proportion indicates a rejection of
equiprobable proportion at the 5% level of significance. A bold face runs test p-value
indicates a rejection of serial independence at the 5% level of significance.
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Table 3: Gamble-Safe Individual Subject Hypothesis Tests
Row Player Column Player
Session
Proportion
left
Runs test
statistic
Runs test
p-value
Proportion
left
Runs test
statistic
Runs test
p-value
1 0.34 -1.54 0.12 0.12 -0.06 0.95
2 0.76 -0.69 0.49 0.22 0.49 0.62
3 0.71 -1.27 0.21 0.35 -3.21 0.00
4 0.61 -2.02 0.04 0.06 0.67 0.51
5 0.15 -7.36 0.00 0.24 0.14 0.89
6 0.62 0.19 0.85 0.52 0.22 0.83
7 0.51 -1.00 0.32 0.00 --- ---
8 0.48 -3.00 0.00 0.06 0.67 0.51
9 0.34 0.92 0.36 0.43 -2.05 0.04
10 0.46 2.69 0.01 0.52 0.22 0.83
11 0.32 1.04 0.30 0.41 1.79 0.07
12 0.35 0.55 0.58 0.47 0.64 0.52
13 0.70 -2.40 0.02 0.27 2.45 0.01
14 0.43 -2.88 0.00 0.31 -1.36 0.17
15 0.17 -2.95 0.00 0.19 -1.24 0.21
Notes: A bold face proportion indicates a rejection of the Nash equilibrium, or 50%,
proportion at the 5% level of significance. An underlined proportion indicates a rejection
of the same test in favor of the alternative that play is less than 50% at the 5% level of
significance. A bold-face runs test p-value indicates a rejection of serial independence at
the 5% level of significance. Missing values due to inapplicability of test on data with zero
variation.
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